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1. The Regulation of Funded Pensions – Towards Neo-liberalism or Hybridisation? 
 
Since the 1990s, pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) pension systems have been under increasing 
political pressure. In particular, so-called Bismarckian countries with hitherto extensive 
PAYGO schemes (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and Sweden) embodying high 
collective responsibility for status maintenance in old age have considerably reduced PAYGO 
benefit levels. As a result, the function of unfunded pensions is increasingly restricted to 
preventing poverty in old age. Individuals are encouraged to take out funded pensions in order 
to achieve status maintenance. Thus the difference between Bismarckian and Beveredgian 
countries – which have always restricted the benefit levels of unfunded pensions to poverty 
prevention (Australia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland and the UK) – seems to be 
eroding. Consequently, the cross-national mean level of state intervention seems to be falling 
while the spread of national pension policies seems to be narrowing. Pension systems in 
OECD countries seem to converge on a subsided state intervention plateau, Box 9 (Rothgang 
& Dingeldey, figure 2, this volume). 
However, theories of pension policy change that focus solely on the financial 
dimension neglect the regulatory aspect of funded pension provision (Leisering 2006). 
Regulation is important because funded pension provision can be embedded in different 
institutional governance structures. These structures may exhibit a high degree of collective 
responsibility for status maintenance in old age (cf. Modigliani & Muralidhar 2004) or a high 
degree of individual responsibility for status maintenance (cf. Littlewood 1998). Other authors 
propose various regulatory measures that balance collective and individual responsibility 
(Sunstein & Thaler 2003; James 2005; Le Grand 2003, 139). Hence, the shift from PAYGO 
towards funding does not necessarily indicate a process of neo-liberal convergence towards 
unfettered markets.  
Instead, some authors (Leisering 2006; Nullmeier 2001) suggest that the regulation of 
funded pension schemes will be based on a mixture of governance elements, as is the case 
with health policy (see Rothgang, this volume), thereby producing intermediate levels of 
collective intervention. This ‘hybridisation hypothesis’ suggests that social policy structures 
and market mechanisms will become increasingly intertwined. The hierarchical structures of 
the old provider welfare state are likely to be replaced by market mechanisms because of 
cultural individualisation, but public pressure on political actors to ensure financial security 
for pensioners will encourage the establishment of socially regulated markets. 
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In order to examine the hybridisation hypothesis, I propose a theoretical concept of 
funded pension regulation and differentiate between three ideal types of regulatory 
governance (section 2). In sections 3-6, the development of the regulation of funded pensions 
in three groups of Western countries that had structurally different pension systems in the 
1980s is investigated empirically. The developments will be analyzed with reference to the 
ideal typology in order to enable genuine comparisons. Section 7 concludes the chapter with 
an analysis of the extent to which funded pension regulations converged towards 
hybridization or a particular ideal type between 1980 and 2005.  
 
2. An Ideal Typology of Funded Pension Regulation 
 
Following Leisering (2006), the regulation of funded pension provision is conceptualised here 
as encompassing all responses to the (anticipated) failure of financial markets by normative, 
legal, organisational and financial means institutionalised by collective actors (state/social 
partners). The following four central potential market failures jeopardising the security, 
efficiency and equity of funded pension provision are particularly intensively debated in the 
current literature: 
  a) Myopia. Individuals may undervalue future needs in old age compared to present 
desires (hyperbolic discounting) (Mitchell & Utkus 2003). This raises the question of whether 
saving in funded schemes should be collectively enforced, promoted by state subsidies, etc. 
b) Volatility risk. Financial markets are quite volatile, not only in the short term but 
even over retirement saving periods of 40 years (Burtless 2000). Such volatility can 
undermine the security of retirement planning and produce artificial inequalities between 
different birth cohorts. Legal minimum guarantees or forms of intergenerational solidarity can 
be instituted to give savers more security (Modigliani & Muralidhar 2004).  
c) Choice risk. The average pension consumer is overwhelmed by choice overload 
(Iyengar et al. 2003), and often chooses investment products that are inappropriate (Cronqvist 
2003; James 2005; Kahneman et al. 2005). As financial education hardly helps (Erturk et al. 
2005; Mitchell & Utkus 2003), this raises the question of whether individual freedom of 
choice should be collectively guided or even abolished in favour of collective asset pooling in 
a common investment portfolio. 
d) Administration charges. Administration costs in decentralised funded pension 
schemes with individual accounts are considerably higher than in PAYGO and centralised 
funded pension schemes (Döring 2002, 115), thereby reducing accumulated pension savings 
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considerably (Furman 2005; Murthi et al. 2001). This raises the question of whether provider 
charges should be legally capped or whether the accumulation process should be centralised 
in order to exploit economies of scale (Kotlikoff 1999, 20 f.), etc. 
 
Examination of the different theoretical recommendations for best practice in the 
economic literature reveals three ideal-type regulatory strategies for funded pension 
provision: 
a) The neo-liberal governance strategy, which emphasises competition and exit, 
relegates responsibility for status maintenance primarily to the individual, implying a low 
level of collective intervention (e.g. Littlewood 1998). This approach relies on consumer 
sovereignty to overcome myopia. Trusting the market’s ‘invisible hand’ (Smith) as a 
masterful ‘discovery device’ (Hayek), it regards the enforcement of unfettered provider 
competition and market transparency as sufficient to provide protection against financial 
market downturns, high charges and inappropriate providers/products.  
b) In the social-liberal governance strategy, which balances hierarchy and competition, 
responsibility for securing status maintenance is to be shared between individuals and society, 
which implies an intermediate level of collective intervention. In order to prevent myopia 
without falling into the trap of paternalism, automatic enrolment with the possibility of opting 
out is proposed (Sunstein & Thaler 2003). This automatic enrolment may or may not be 
accompanied by direct state subsidies (matching contributions) (Le Grand 2003, 139). 
Volatility risk should be cushioned by moderate minimum return guarantees or by automatic 
enrolment in life-cycle funds (Munnell & Sunden 2004, 175), with the asset mix being 
gradually shifted from stocks toward less volatile bonds with increasing customer age. As far 
as choice risk is concerned, this governance strategy proposes the establishment of a so-called 
institutional market (James 2005) in which individual choice is restricted to a handful of 
appropriate, i.e. broadly diversified index funds, which charge low fees because they just 
replicate the asset compilations of financial market indices. The providers of these funds are 
to be chosen by a public regulator. As the institutional market reaps economies of scale via 
centralised contribution collection, yearly administration charges should be legally capped 
clearly below 1% of assets per account.  
c) The social-democratic governance strategy, which stresses hierarchy and voice, 
relegates responsibility for status maintenance to the state and/or the social partners, which 
implies a high degree of collective intervention. This approach stipulates participation in 
funded schemes, with a collective actor paying contributions for the unemployed and those 
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caring for children. A defined benefit level, stipulated as a certain percentage of the average 
net wage, is determined and guaranteed via intergenerational sharing of financial market risks 
(Bovenberg 2002; Modigliani & Muralidhar 2004). The scheme is established on a centralised 
(nation or industry-wide) level and members’ assets are pooled in a single collective portfolio 
and managed by monopolist actors, i.e. corporatist or public agencies (legally independent 
from the government), so as to reduce administration costs by exploiting economies of scale. 
Members can express their concerns by collective voice, i.e. via elected representatives on 
member councils.  
 
Table 1: Three Ideal Types of Funded Pension Regulation 
 
           IDEAL TYPE 
 
Issue/problem 
SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE 
STRATEGY 
SOCIAL-LIBERAL 
GOVERNANCE 
STRATEGY 
NEO-LIBERAL 
GOVERNANCE 
STRATEGY 
Responsibility for 
status maintenance 
Collective actors  
(state and/or social partners) 
Individual citizen and the state 
(shared responsibility) 
Individual citizen 
Myopia  Mandatory participation Automatic enrolment  
(with possibility of opting out) 
and/or state subsidies 
Voluntary participation 
(individual must opt in) 
Volatility risk Defined benefit 
via 
intergenerational  
risk-sharing 
Moderate minimum return 
guarantees 
or 
automatic enrolment in  
life-cycle funds 
Defined contribution 
 
Choice risk Pooling of members’ assets 
in a collective portfolio; 
no provider competition; 
collective voice via member 
councils instead of 
individual choice 
Individual choice  
in the institutional market is 
restricted to a handful of 
broadly diversified index 
funds chosen by a public 
regulator 
Unrestricted  
provider competition; 
unrestricted  
individual choice 
Administration 
charges 
Reaping economies of scale 
by 
collective pooling of assets 
in monopolist corporatist 
funds or a public fund 
Legal cap on charges clearly 
below 1% of assets in an 
account - facilitated by 
centralised contribution 
collection in the institutional 
market  
Fostering 
competition  
 
 
 
 
3. Three Ways of Achieving Status Maintenance in Old Age in the 1980s 
 
In the 1980s, the pension systems in OECD countries could be divided into three groups 
depending on their policy toward status maintenance in old age. 
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The first group comprised the ‘Anglo-American early funders’ (Australia, Canada, 
Ireland, New Zealand, the UK and the US). Here, average earners had always been dependent 
on funded pension schemes for securing status maintenance, because the replacement rate of 
the unfunded pillar(s) was too low to achieve status maintenance. In accordance with the 
economically liberal culture in these countries, funded schemes were rather loosely regulated 
(participation was not collectively enforced; no collectively standardised replacement target 
levels were set, etc.).  
The second group was made up of the ‘European early funders’ (Finland, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland). Here, (partially1) funded schemes with mandatory participation 
explicitly designed to ensure the status maintenance of average earners were established by 
the state and/or the social partner much earlier than in other European countries, i.e. in 1985 at 
the latest. These schemes were quite strictly regulated (participation was (quasi)mandatory; 
collectively standardised replacement target levels were established, etc.).  
The third group consists of the ‘European late funders’ (Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany and Sweden). Here, until the year 2000, average earners were able to rely on 
mandatory PAYGO schemes for achieving status maintenance.  
Have these three country groups, located at different points of the pension policy field 
in the 1980s, now converged towards a common policy path with regard not only to the 
financial dimension (funded pensions are indispensable for status maintenance in all these 
countries nowadays) but also with regard to the regulation of these funded pensions? Or are 
there different varieties of funded pension regulation? The next three sections examine these 
questions by investigating one country in each group (the US, the Netherlands, and Sweden). I  
also examine briefly the extent to which the developments outlined in each case study are 
representative of the group as a whole. 
 
4. Regulatory Developments in Anglo-American Early Funder Countries (1980-2005) 
 
4.1. The US: Reinforcing the Neo-Liberal Features of Regulation 
 
The US pension system comprises 1) a mandatory PAYGO pillar (Social Security), 2) a 
means-tested programme for poor pensioners (Supplementary Security Income) and 3) funded 
pension plans, especially in the occupational sector. Social security provides average earners 
                                                 
1
 Finland’s second pillar combines PAYGO (roughly 75%) and funding (roughly 25%). 
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with a full career with a prospective net replacement rate of a mere 51% (VDR 2005, 155), 
which is insufficient for status maintenance. 
 
4.1.1. Myopia Regulation in the US 
  
Employers have never been obliged to offer occupational pension plans. Until the early 1980s, 
employers who voluntarily offered plans usually enrolled their employees automatically in 
what were predominantly defined benefit (DB) plans with prescribed contribution rates. In 
contrast, only 14% (2002) of the now dominant defined contributions (DC) plans have 
adopted automatic enrolment and employees choose their personal contribution rate. Thus the 
prevention of myopia is now more than ever an individual issue. Although the coverage rate 
for the private workforce did not decline, it remained at a rather low level of about 40% 
between 1980 and 2000 (Munnell & Sunden 2004, 7). Empirical evidence for myopia is 
strong: 60% of employees have not calculated how much they have to save for retirement, 
40% appear unlikely to achieve status maintenance by age 65 and many experience an 
unexpected decline in their living standard after retirement (Mitchell & Utkus 2003, 3). 
Whereas high earners benefit strongly from tax exemptions offered under regressive EET2 
taxation, there are no direct state subsidies for low or moderate income earners with negligible 
or zero income tax liabilities. 
Clearly, myopia regulation in the US reflects a reinforced neo-liberal governance 
strategy. 
 
4.1.2. Volatility Risk Regulation in the US 
 
Volatility risk has been shifted from employers to employees since 1980. In the 1970s, the 
majority of occupational pension schemes were DB plans. However, some workers lost a 
huge part of their promised benefits when their company went insolvent. For example, the 
automobile factory Studebaker went bankrupt in 1963 when its DB pension plan was 80% in 
deficit. The US legislature eventually reacted to those problems with the passing of the 
Employees’ Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974. This act introduced 
mandatory minimum vesting standards, minimum funding requirements and insolvency 
insurance.  
                                                 
2
 EET means that saving contributions are deducted from taxable income (E = exempt), investment yields are not 
taxed (E = exempt) while pension benefits are taxed (T = taxed).  
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However, ERISA not only increased the security of employees’ pensions but also 
raised employers’ costs (e.g. bankruptcy insurance premiums) and their investment risk. 
Between 1981 and 1996, these costs tripled as a percentage of the payroll (Munnell & Sunden 
2004, 27). As a result, new companies have increasingly resorted to DC plans, which were 
granted tax advantages under Section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code, passed into law in 
1980. These 401(k) plans are not subject to ERISA regulation and employers bear no 
investment risk. Whereas only 30% of all contributions to funded pensions went into DC 
plans in 1975, these plans received over 80% of all contributions in 1998 (Munnell & Sunden 
2004, 19). 
The shift from DB to DC shows that volatility risk regulation in the US reflects a 
reinforced neo-liberal governance strategy. 
 
4.1.3. Choice Risk Regulation in the US 
 
In contrast to DB plans, which are dwindling in number, the increasing number of 401(k) 
plans offers employees a wide range of investment choice options, which is not statutorily 
restricted. In 1995, 50% of 401(k) participants had a choice between at least 16 alternatives 
(Munnell & Sunden 2004, 70). However, many savers lack the skills required to make 
sensible investment choices (Mitchell & Utkus 2003, 21). Moreover, a representative 
investigation by Elton et al. (2004) showed that the investment options offered by employers 
were inadequate in 62% of cases.  
Furthermore, 401(k) plan members are exposed to the risk of under-diversification that 
heavy investment in employer stock entails. Whereas DB plan participants are sheltered by 
ERISA, which stipulates that not more than 10% of plan assets may be invested in the 
employer’s company, 401(k) plan legislation contains no such restriction. Approximately 
20% of 401(k) plan participants hold over 20% of their portfolio in employer stock. The share 
of employer stock in 401(k) plan assets can reach staggering heights, ranging between 66% 
(Gillette) and 96% (Proctor & Gamble) (Kaplan 2004, 72 f.). One reason is that employers are 
allowed to make their matching contributions in the form of company stock. Age-related 
selling restrictions regarding employer stock are also permitted. Enron employees could not 
sell their Enron equities in their 401(k) account until they reached the age of 50 or left the 
company.  
Legislative initiatives before and in the wake of the Enron crisis to put caps on 
employer stock in 401(k) plans have failed. Employer organisations threatened that 
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employers’ matching contributions – an important savings incentive for employees – would 
decrease: 
 
‘If employers are prohibited from requiring their contributions to defined contribution plans 
to be invested in employer stock, they are likely to curtail their contributions, thereby 
reducing employees’ retirement saving.’ (ERIC 2002) 
 
Moreover, such caps are not popular among US employees. Many of them like having a high 
slice of their pension portfolio invested in their company, because a familiarity bias (‘invest in 
what you know’) makes them believe (falsely) that investment in employer stock is safer than 
diversified funds (Kaplan 2004, 75). Even the meltdown of 401(k) plan assets at Enron, 
WorldCom and Global Crossing – all heavily invested in employer stock – did not affect the 
popularity of employer stock among US employees (Choi et al. 2005).  
Clearly, choice risk regulation in the US reflects a reinforced neo-liberal governance 
strategy. 
 
4.1.4. Administration Charge Regulation in the US 
 
The charges levied on 401(k) plans are not statutorily regulated and – despite fierce 
provider competition – are very high. Annual average fees amount to 1.44% of assets 
(Thompson 2002, 30), reducing total pension capital at retirement by roughly 30%. 
Administration charge regulation in the US exemplifies the neo-liberal governance 
strategy. 
 
4.2. Funded Pension Regulation in Other Anglo-American Early Funder Countries 
 
The other English-speaking countries can be divided into three groups with regard to the 
development of funded pension regulation: North America, where neo-liberal governance has 
persisted, Australia, Ireland and New Zealand, where governance takes a hybrid form, and the 
UK, where there is the prospect of a switch to social-liberal governance. Hence, the average 
level of state intervention in the Anglo-American group has increased somewhat. 
As in the US, the regulation of Canadian occupational registered pension plans (RPPs) 
and private registered retirement savings plans’ (RRSPs) still follows a neo-liberal 
governance strategy. 
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In Australia, New Zealand and, especially, in Ireland, the regulation of funded 
pensions has become more mixed. In 1992, Australia introduced the mandatory 
superannuation scheme. While charges in these DC plans remain unregulated and individual 
investment choice options have been extended, the Australian state has inaugurated subsidies 
(superannuation co-contribution) for additional voluntary retirement savings by low wage 
earners in 2002. The amount of these subsidies was expanded in 2005. 
New Zealand has opted to go down the social-liberal route by automatically enrolling 
employees in the Kiwi Saver scheme established by act of parliament in 2005, coupled with 
universal start-up subsidies. Moreover, the government subsidizes and negotiates downwards 
the charges levied by default providers. 
Ireland established personal retirement savings accounts (PRSAs) in 2002. Saving in 
these DC schemes is voluntary, but those who participate are automatically enrolled in a life-
cycle fund. Moreover, annual charges have been statutorily capped – albeit at the fairly high 
level of >1% of assets. Furthermore, the public regulator of funded pension schemes, the Irish 
Pensions Board (on which sit representatives from all relevant ministries and interest groups), 
has recently unanimously suggested replacing regressive indirect tax relief for contributions 
(EET taxation) by direct, equal matching contributions of € 1 for each € 1 invested by 
individuals (Pensions Board 2005, 15). 
The British government has recently released a white paper (DWP 2006) suggesting 
the establishment of a national pension savings scheme (NPSS) as proposed by the Pensions 
Commission (2005). This scheme features automatic enrolment, a life-cycle fund as the 
default fund and centralised collection of contributions by a public agency with the aim of 
reducing annual charges to 0.3% of assets. Moreover, tempering its former stance on financial 
education and information, the government has explicitly conceded (DWP 2006, 56) that 
many Britons suffer from cognitive choice overload when it comes to financial investments. 
Thus the commission’s recommendation that the number of investment choices in the NPSS 
should be limited to 6-10 suitable funds (Pensions Commission 2005, 376) is acknowledged. 
(DWP 2006, 56). Of course, final legislation is still awaited. 
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Table 2: The Regulation of Funded Pensions in Anglo-American Countries:  
the Current Situation  
 
           ISSUE 
 
 
 
COUNTRY 
Governance 
strategy 
 
Myopia 
Governance 
strategy 
 
Volatility risk 
Governance 
strategy 
 
Choice risk 
Governance 
strategy 
 
Administration 
charges 
Overall 
governance 
strategy 
Australia 
(Superannuation) 
Social-
Democratic + 
Social-Liberal 
Neo-liberal Neo-liberal Neo-liberal Predominantly 
neo-liberal 
Canada 
(RPP & RRSP) 
Neo-liberal Neo-liberal Neo-liberal Neo-liberal Neo-liberal 
Ireland 
(PRSA) 
Neo-liberal 
 
(but social-
liberal reform 
suggested) 
Social-liberal Neo-liberal Social-liberal Hybrid 
New Zealand 
(Kiwi Saver) 
Social-liberal Neo-liberal Neo-liberal Social-liberal Hybrid 
United Kingdom 
(NPSS – as 
currently 
planned) 
Social-liberal Social-liberal Social-liberal Social-liberal Social-liberal 
United States 
(401k  plans) 
Neo-liberal Neo-liberal Neo-liberal Neo-liberal Neo-liberal 
 
 
 
5. Regulatory Developments in European Early Funder Countries (1980-2005) 
 
5.1. The Netherlands: Defying Neo-Liberalism, but Nibbling at Intergenerational 
Solidarity 
 
Besides its first pillar, a residence based, flat-rate citizens’ pension (AOW), the Dutch pension 
landscape is dominated by a funded occupational pillar. These monopolist pension funds – 
predominantly organized on an industry-wide basis – are managed by the social partners. The 
two pillars provide average earners with a full career with a comparatively generous 
prospective net replacement rate of 84.1% (VDR 2005, 123). 
 
5.1.1. Myopia Regulation in the Netherlands 
 
Myopia is prevented in a collective, neo-corporatist manner. The social partners in an industry 
can apply to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment to issue a declaration that 
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employer (and employee) participation in an industry-wide fund is mandatory. Such 
applications are usually successful. Whereas the significance of the third, private pillar is very 
limited (Bieber & Schmitt 2004), the coverage rate for occupational pensions has steadily 
risen to 94% of the workforce (Lutjens 2005). Contribution rates are set by the social partners 
with a total minimum net replacement rate of 70% in mind (VDR 2005, 122). Since 1990, 
coverage gaps have been systematically reduced. Employers have been forbidden to 
discriminate between part-time and full-time employees. A mandatory pension fund for 
employees of temporary employment agencies has been established. A special fund managed 
by the social partners pays contributions on behalf of unemployed people aged 40 years and 
over, provided they are in receipt of unemployment insurance benefits. Discrimination against 
workers with fixed-term jobs has also been legally prohibited (Bieber & Schmitt 2004). The 
social partners aim to reduce the coverage gap to 3.5% by 2006. Otherwise, the government 
has threatened to introduce appropriate legislation (EU Social Protection Committee 2005, 
27).  
Clearly, Dutch myopia regulation reflects a reinforced social-democratic governance 
strategy. 
 
5.1.2. Volatility risk regulation in the Netherlands 
 
Volatility risk in the Netherlands has traditionally been prevented on a collective basis. 
Although legal regulations are missing, almost all occupational pension funds (95%) follow 
the DB principle (Bieber & Schmitt 2005), with intergenerational sharing of financial market 
risks. In average salary schemes, yearly accrual rights are usually fixed at 2.25% of the 
nominal individual wage (VDR 2005, 122). Although not legally mandated, accrued pension 
rights and current pensions were usually indexed to wage growth (Dutch Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Employment 2002, 15).  
In its National Strategy Report on Pensions of 2002, the ministry praised the solidarity and 
efficiency of intergenerational risk-sharing in the Dutch funded DB system: 
‘In such a system, younger generations partially compensate [the retiring generations, T.H.] 
for lower returns when investment results are disappointing by paying higher contributions. 
When returns are healthier, surpluses can be passed on to the next generation. (…) The 
solidarity in the second pillar also delivers efficiency gains. In its report entitled 
‘Generationally-aware Policy’, the Advisory Council on Government Policy (WRR) compared 
DB plans with intergenerational solidarity to DC plans without this form of solidarity. The 
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WRR calculated that in the latter schemes people have to pay 25% more contributions to 
cover the same risk of a decline in the pension result. The WRR concluded that pension 
accrual on the basis of solidarity is more efficient than individual accrual. (…) This solidarity 
makes it possible to achieve good investment returns at a relatively low risk for the 
participants because the risks can be borne collectively.’ (ibidem, 19 & 32) 
The efficiency advantages of intergenerational solidarity have also been stressed by Dutch 
economists (Bovenberg 2002, 311). However, the stock market slump after 2000 revealed 
how badly regulated intergenerational risk-sharing had in fact been. During the 1990s, Dutch 
occupational pension plans accumulated large book surpluses because calculations of 
liabilities were based on a capital yield of 4%, whereas actual asset yields were much higher 
at that time. However, instead of building up reserves to provide a cushion against future 
market slumps, a large part of the surpluses was consumed by granting contributions holidays 
and transferring money from pension funds to companies: 
 
‘…the social partners themselves are responsible for the current problems because they set 
the contribution levels too low in the preceding years. These low contributions – in some 
cases culminating in exemptions from paying contributions for employers and employees, or 
even pay-outs from the pension funds – often served to lubricate collective bargaining”. (Van 
Het Kaar 2004) 
Dutch governments – keen on reining in non-wage labour costs and tax-exempt pension 
contributions – reinforced this myopic behaviour: 
‘This distorted image helped to create the opportunity, in 1989, for a draft act to be sent to 
parliament, a draft act that was withdrawn only last year, which intended to counter the 
creation and maintenance of structural solvency surpluses by pension funds. Those were the 
days! Yet it put pension funds under pressure to avoid the creation of (substantial) solvency 
surpluses and to reduce pension contributions. Apart from impending government measures 
to skim off pension funds’ solvency surpluses, contribution policies also came under pressure 
from agreements between the government and the social partners. (…) They might now have 
many billions of euros at their disposal if contribution discounts had been limited.” 
(Witteveen 2005) 
Thus the buffers required to cushion the market slump after 2000 were often not available. 
Consequently, the average contribution rate had to be increased from 8.2% (1997) to 14% 
(2004) (EU Social Protection Committee 2005, 20). Pension indexation was sharply reduced 
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(Bieber & Schmitt 2004). Employers, employees and pensioners became embroiled in 
protracted distributional conflicts: 
‘The construction company HBG is one of a number of companies against which 
retired employees have instituted legal proceedings in the hope of forcing the company to 
redeposit into its pension fund money previously transferred for other purposes. Over the past 
few years, HBG has reportedly taken surplus profits from the fund, but now finds itself facing 
a shortfall of dramatically lower share prices. The former employees are demanding a 
supplementary deposit of no less than € 76 million over and above the extra 14 million the 
company has already paid into the fund. For the time being, HBG is refusing to do so. (…) 
Pensioners now claim that the company’s transfer out of the fund of positive investment 
results has left insufficient leeway for the creation of much needed reserves. (…) Sharply 
declining capital reserves have made it impossible to pay out annual pension adjustments in 
line with price increases.’ (Grünell 2002)  
 
Nevertheless, industry-wide occupational funds in the Netherlands have preserved 
intergenerational solidarity. The strong increase in the average contribution rate in response to 
the slump shows that losses have been shared between active and retired generations instead 
of the burden being borne solely by retirees, which is typical of DC systems. 
However, some observers (Noorman 2004) argue that the introduction of the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for publicly listed EU companies will lead large Dutch 
companies listed on the stock market to switch to DC pension plans. While the latter do not 
have to be included in companies’ balance sheets as they imply no liabilities, IFRS prescribe 
that the market value of the assets and liabilities of DB company pension funds must be 
included in companies’ balance sheets, thereby making company results more volatile. Listed 
companies want to avoid this. A shift to DC is indeed what is happening currently in some 
Dutch company schemes, but not in industry-wide schemes: 
‘At a number of companies pension risk is being shifted towards the employees. Akzo 
Nobel (chemicals) has reached agreement with trade unions to switch completely to a DC 
occupational pension scheme. The desire has been amplified as a consequence of the recent 
introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), obliging companies to 
offer more insight into their financial risks, including potential pension obligations. Similar 
schemes have been introduced at SNS Reaalgroep (banking/insurance) and Philips 
(electronics). (…) It is noteworthy that this appears to be the case only with company-level 
pension funds for the time being.” (Van Het Kaar 2004)    
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 The most likely future development regarding volatility risk regulation is a 
polarisation between Dutch company and industry-wide funds (with more than 75% of Dutch 
employees belonging to the latter): 
‘Rabobank anticipates a shift from DB to DC schemes, but this may not sit too easily 
with the pension culture in the Netherlands. (…) In general, there is a lot of consensus about 
the idea that DB is superior to DC as it allows having a longer-term investment horizon, 
translating into higher returns. (…) Mr van den Brink foresees a shift to DC, but only for 
company, not for industry-wide, pension funds.”3  
 Thus the mode of volatility risk regulation in the Netherlands has shifted from being 
exclusively social-democratic in nature to being merely predominantly social-democratic 
today. 
 
5.1.3. Choice Risk Regulation in the Netherlands 
 
Members of Dutch pension funds cannot choose between different investment providers/pro-
ducts. Instead, contributions are invested in a common portfolio by expert advisers employed 
by the social partners on behalf of fund members. Contrary to 401(k) plans in the US, 
investments in companies affiliated with an occupational plan are legally restricted to 10% of 
assets (Lutjens 2005). Members cannot quit the pension fund of the industry or company in 
which they are employed. Hence there is no provider competition for members. Instead, 
members can express their concerns via their representatives on members’ councils, which 
have the right to take legal action if the plan’s board does not follow its recommendations 
(Bieber & Schmitt 2004). Seventy-five per cent of the Dutch population prefer the current DB 
system without individual choice to a competitive DC system with individual choice (Van 
Rooij et al. 2004, 15). Provider competition is rejected: 
 
There is in the Netherlands no competition between pension funds. And there is also no need 
for competition. (…) The social partners in these branches or companies decide on the 
premium schemes, they pay the premiums and administer the pension fund. Because they pay 
the premiums themselves, they have the best incentive for effective and efficiently governed 
pension funds.’ (Peter Stein, Pension Expert in the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment) (Stein 2004, 202)   
                                                 
3
 See FT Mandate: “Dutch legislation shake-up”, 
http://www.ftmandate.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/751/Dutch_legislation_shake-up.html. 
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 Thus choice risk regulation in the Netherlands has maintained the social-democratic 
governance strategy, which favours collective voice over individual choice. 
 
5.1.4. Administration Charge Regulation in the Netherlands 
 
Administration charges are minimised in the Dutch pension system by an emphasis on 
centralised, non-profit-making schemes. These schemes are organised on an industry-wide 
basis in the form of mutually owned financial conglomerates providing all services to member 
companies in-house. This mode of organisation is preferred to decentralised, profit-making 
schemes. Administrative costs in industry-wide occupational funds are considerably lower 
than in commercial schemes (Döring 2002, 115). Dutch governments have not been keen on 
promoting individualised pension saving in the third pillar; the second pillar has no upper 
ceiling on the wage from which contributions are deducted and in 2001 legislation was passed 
that restricted tax exemptions to those contributions aimed at reaching a total net replacement 
rate of not more than 70% (Lutjens 2005) – the social partners’ official target (Bieber & 
Schmitt 2004). 
Clearly, administration charge regulation in the Netherlands adheres to the social-
democratic governance strategy. 
 
5.2. Funded Pension Regulation in Other European Early Funder Countries 
 
As in the Netherlands, the regulation of funded pension schemes in other European Early 
Funder countries remains dominated by social-democratic governance strategies. Participation 
in (partially) funded second pillars in both Finland and Switzerland remains mandatory. 
Neither offers any investment choice for employees but both feature provider competition for 
employers, who negotiate collective contracts on behalf of their workforces. Assets are still 
pooled at (multi-)company level in order to keep administration costs down.  
The Swiss and Finnish systems have evolved differently as far as volatility risk is concerned. 
In the wake of the global financial market slump after 2000, the Swiss occupational pillar has 
been transformed from a de facto DB system into a DC system with a minimum interest 
guarantee that varies with financial market developments. In contrast, the Finnish statutory 
earnings-related pillar adheres to the DB principle. To be sure, the Finnish pension reform in 
2005 introduced a life expectancy coefficient so that the future benefit level of a retirement 
cohort will be dependent on its life expectancy. However, the Finnish Government does not 
 18 
promote private pensions to compensate for the expected benefit reductions resulting from the 
life-expectancy factor. Instead, it is encouraging workers to remain in employment for longer 
and has strongly increased the financial incentives to delay retirement. The Finnish state has 
retained its responsibility for status maintenance: 
‘The earnings-related pension scheme provides earnings-adjusted, insurance-based pensions, 
which ensure to a reasonable degree that all wage and salary earners and self-employed 
persons retain their level of consumption after retirement.’ (Finland’s National Pensions 
Strategy Report 2005, 5) 
However, because intergenerational risk-sharing has been abolished in Swiss 
occupational plans and its coverage has been reduced in the Netherlands, the average level of 
collective intervention in this group has decreased somewhat.   
 
 
Table 3: The Regulation of Funded Pensions in European Early Funder Countries: the 
Current Situation 
 
             ISSUE 
 
 
 
COUNTRY 
Governance 
strategy 
 
Myopia 
Governance 
strategy 
 
Volatility risk 
Governance 
strategy 
 
Choice risk 
Governance 
strategy 
 
Administration 
charges 
Overall 
governance 
strategy 
Finland 
(TEL) 
Social-
democratic 
Social-
democratic 
Social-
democratic 
Social-
democratic 
Social-
democratic 
Netherlands 
(Pensioen 
Polder) 
Social-
democratic 
Social-
democratic 
(Industry-wide 
schemes) 
 
Neo-liberal 
(company 
schemes) 
Social-
democratic 
Social-
democratic 
Predominantly 
social-
democratic 
Switzerland 
(BVG) 
Social-
democratic 
Social-liberal Social-
democratic 
Social-
democratic 
Predominantly 
social-
democratic 
 
 
6. Regulatory Developments in European Late Funder Countries (1980-2005) 
 
6.1. Sweden: Mixing Individual and Collective Responsibility 
 
Until the mid-1990s, the Swedish pension system comprised a universal flat-rate citizens’ 
pension, an earnings-related PAYGO system (ATP) and quasi-mandatory, funded occupa-
tional DB schemes administered by the social partners. The pension reform of 1998 
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transformed the first pillar into a means-tested one, converted the ATP into a notional defined 
contribution system and added a new funded pillar named ‘Premium Pension’ (PP).  
 
6.1.1. Myopia Regulation in Sweden 
 
Despite the reform, myopia is still largely prevented at the collective level. The mandatory 
ATP, the mandatory PP (with a statutory contribution rate of 2.5%) and the quasi-mandatory 
occupational pension schemes provide average earners with a full working career with a total 
prospective net replacement rate of 68.2% (VDR 2005, 135). Furthermore, the state pays 
contributions into the PP on behalf of those caring for children and individuals receiving 
unemployment benefits (Sunden 2004, 5). 
Swedish myopia regulation adheres to the social-democratic mode of governance.  
 
6.1.2. Volatility Risk Regulation in Sweden 
 
The new PP scheme is a DC system without minimum benefit guarantees with regard to the 
investment accumulation process. However, when account balances are converted into 
annuities at retirement, retirees do benefit from a minimum interest guarantee:  
 
 ‘In order to reduce interest rate risk, the Swedish government guarantees a minimum 
rate of return of 2.7% for converting account balances to annuities.’ (Turner 2005, 2) 
 In 1998, the STP, the occupational pension scheme for blue-collar employees, was 
replaced by the SAF-LO, a DC system. Very recently, the occupational pension scheme for 
white-collar employees (ITP) was also changed into a DC system, although employees have 
to invest half of their contributions into funds with guaranteed minimum returns (SSA 2006).  
Thus as far as volatility risk is concerned, Sweden has shifted from a social-
democratic governance strategy (DB) to a mixture of neo-liberal and social-liberal governance 
(DC with partial minimum return guarantees). 
 
6.1.3. Choice Risk Regulation in Sweden 
 
The Premium Pension offers 705 funds managed by 82 providers (Premium Pension 
Committee 2005, 45). A representative survey revealed that 52% of participants complained 
about having insufficient knowledge and expertise to choose appropriate funds (ibid. 38). This 
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critical self-estimation was confirmed by a detailed empirical investigation of PP savers’ 
investment behaviour: 
‘The Swedish experience shows that many individual investors (indeed, many more 
than expected) paid attention to non-informative fund advertising, made an active choice, and 
chose portfolios with the opposite characteristics of those most economists would find 
attractive.’ (Cronqvist 2003, 31) 
 Moreover, despite the fact that their investments have often performed very badly, 
most participants have not restructured their portfolios: by the spring of 2005, only 12% of 
premium pension savers had switched once or more (Premium Pension Committee 2005, 36). 
However, without sophisticated investors, provider competition cannot function well. 
The Swedish government recognized that average citizens have considerable 
difficulties in making appropriate choices in the face of such a proliferation of investment 
offers and commissioned an academic evaluation: 
 ‘The Swedish National Audit Office notes that in many cases pension savers have 
found it difficult to cope with their role as managers. The sheer variety of funds to choose 
between is felt by some pension savers to be a problem.’4 
 
However, the evaluation report broadly approved the wide array of choices: 
 
„The committee’s basic stand is that a fund category or type of fund cannot in itself be 
considered unnecessary or impractical in a well compiled portfolio for pension investments. 
To reduce the risk of systematically poor outcomes one solution might be to develop a better 
decision-making support to help pension savers evaluate their choices instead of excluding 
certain categories of funds. (…) Pension savers that elect to be guided throughout the process 
should be presented with a limited selection of broad, cost-effective funds, which means they 
are guided to a highly diversified fund portfolio managed at low fees.” (Premium Pension 
Committee 2005, 46 ff.)  
 
However, the choice problem has been partially solved by scheme participants 
themselves, as many of them (90% of new entrants) nowadays renounce active investment 
choice so that they are automatically enrolled in a high-quality default fund (Cronqvist & 
Thaler 2004) managed by the Premium Pension Authority. The importance of the central 
                                                 
4
 ‘Evaluation of the premium pension system’, Swedish Finance Ministry press release of June 23, 2004. See 
www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/586/a/26809/m/wai. 
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default fund can be seen when the Swedish system is compared with the Australian 
superannuation scheme, where employers usually determine default funds, which are of 
varying and often questionable quality (Gallery et al. 2004).  
Thus, Swedish choice risk regulation mixes elements of neo-liberal (high number of 
products and providers) and social-liberal governance (a central default fund of high quality). 
 
 
 
6.1.4. Administration Charge Regulation in Sweden 
 
The institutional structure of the new PP scheme shows its creators were especially concerned 
to keep administration charges down through administrative centralisation. Individual 
accounts are not administered on a decentralised basis by commercial providers, but by a 
public authority, the Premium Pension Authority (PPM). After Swedish citizens have notified 
the PPM of their preferred fund(s), the PPM collects the contributions and distributes them on 
an aggregated, anonymous basis to commercial providers. This reduces administration costs 
by centralising paperwork, enabling the bulk trading of fund switches and eliminating com-
missions to sales agents. 
Providers have to pass these efficiency gains on to their customers. A statutory 
formula determines the permitted maximum level of charges. Funds attracting a small amount 
of mandatory PP contributions may charge up to 0.85% of assets (annually), whereas large 
funds may charge not more than 0.15% (Whitehouse 2000). Switching charges are prohibited 
(Weaver 2005). The current average fee amounts to 0.43% (Sunden 2004) to which must be 
added a levy of 0.27% for the PPM’s administrative work, making a total average charge of 
0.7% – half of the US level. Moreover, this is expected to fall to 0.25% in the future as the 
system matures (Weaver 2005).  
Administration charge regulation in Swedish occupational pension funds resembles 
that in the PP scheme. Here, equivalent organisations (Fora in the SAF-LO scheme, SPP in 
the ITP scheme) established by the social partners fulfil functions similar to those of the PPM.  
Administration charge regulation in Sweden is consistent with a social-liberal 
governance strategy, i.e. an institutional market with a charge cap. 
 
6.2. Funded Pension Regulation in Other European Late Funder Countries 
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Like Sweden, other European late funder countries mix neo-liberal, social-liberal and social-
democratic governance strategies, though in different ways. 
Germany and Austria combine elements of neo-liberal governance (no charge caps) 
with elements of social-liberal governance. Both have introduced matching contributions paid 
by the government into their private schemes (named Riester Rente (Germany) / 
Prämienbegünstigte Zukunftsvorsorge (Austria)), and both guarantee non-negative returns. 
One element of social-democratic governance is that, in both countries, the investment fund 
provider in the new occupational pension schemes is chosen by the social partners at company 
(Austria) or industry level (Germany). 
Belgium also combines elements of neo-liberal (voluntary participation), social-liberal 
(minimum interest rate guarantee, statutory charge cap) and social-democratic governance 
(promoting occupational plans with collective investment at industry/company level and 
granting its members collective voice facilities for expressing discontent). 
Only France pursues a purely neo-liberal governance strategy with regard to its 
individual ‘plan d’épargne retraite populaire’ (PERP) and its occupational ‘plan d’épargne 
pour la retraite collectif’ (PERCO) established by the Fillon Act in 2003. Participation in 
these DC plans is voluntary, the state grants no matching contributions and neither individual 
investment options nor charges are regulated. 
 
 
Table 4: Funded Pension Regulation in European Late Funder Countries: the Current 
Situation 
 
              ISSUE 
 
 
 
 
COUNTRY 
Governance 
strategy 
 
Myopia 
Governance 
strategy 
 
Volatility 
risk 
Governance 
strategy 
 
Choice risk 
Governance 
strategy 
 
Administration 
charges 
Overall 
governance 
strategy 
Austria 
(Prämienbegünstigte 
Zukunftsvorsorge) 
Social-
liberal 
Social-
liberal 
Neo-liberal 
 
New occupational 
pensions 
(Abfertigung Neu): 
Social-democratic 
Neo-liberal Hybrid 
Belgium 
(Vandenbroucke 
Act of 2003: Social 
Pension Schemes) 
 
Neo-liberal Social-
liberal 
Social-democratic Social-liberal Hybrid 
France Neo-liberal Neo-liberal Neo-liberal Neo-liberal Neo-liberal 
 23 
(PERP + PERCO) 
Germany  
(Riester-Rente) 
Social-
liberal 
Social-
liberal 
Neo-liberal 
 
New occupational 
pensions: social-
democratic 
Neo-liberal Hybrid 
Sweden  
(Premium Pension) 
Social-
democratic 
Neo-liberal 
& 
social-liberal 
Neo-liberal 
& 
social-liberal 
Social-liberal Hybrid 
 
 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Firstly, taking all national developments together, the average level of collective responsibil-
ity for status maintenance has decreased. 
(A) European late funder countries have considerably reduced the degree of collective 
responsibility by shifting the task of status maintenance from PAYGO systems with high 
degrees of collective responsibility to funded systems with either intermediate levels of 
collective responsibility, as in Sweden in particular, but also in Belgium, Germany and 
Austria or even, as in France, a very low level of collective responsibility. 
(B) Four out of the six Anglo-American countries have increased, or plan to increase, 
the degree of collective responsibility by shifting from funded systems with low degrees of 
collective responsibility to systems with low-to-intermediate or intermediate degrees of 
collective responsibility. This applies particularly to Ireland and, prospectively, the UK and to 
a lesser extent to Australia and New Zealand 
(C) Two out of the three European early funder countries (Switzerland and the 
Netherlands) have slightly decreased the degree of collective intervention by (partially) 
abolishing the intergenerational sharing of financial market risks.  
If we assume that the opposed trends in (B) and (C) roughly offset each other, only the 
decrease in collective responsibility in group (A) remains.  
Secondly, the comparison shows that the absolute spread of regulatory regimes has 
remained constant. The US, which has with the lowest degree of collective responsibility for 
status maintenance, shows no signs of increasing intervention, while Finland, which has the 
highest degree of collective responsibility, has not lessened the social-democratic character of 
its regulatory system. At the same time, however, the average level of state intervention in the 
Anglo-American group has increased slightly, while the average extent of collective 
intervention in the European Early Funder group has decreased slightly. Thus the average 
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variance of regulatory regimes has declined somewhat: the variety has not disappeared but it 
has been reduced to some degree. 
Taken together, the reduced total average level of collective intervention and the 
reduced total average variance of regulation show that, even if both the financial dimension 
and the regulatory dimension of pension policy are taken into account, we indeed end up in 
Box 9 (i.e. convergence towards a reduced level of intervention), (see Rothgang & Dingeldey, 
figure 2, this volume). 
Nevertheless, it would be inappropriate to speak of a neo-liberal race to the regulatory 
bottom. To be sure, neo-liberal recommendations have found their way into the regulation of 
funded pensions in European late funder countries, despite their doubtful adequacy. Neo-
liberal beliefs about superior regulation and concomitant, overly simplistic notions of self-
responsibility propagated by societal elites have often been influential. Thus the regulatory 
frameworks for the new funded systems that have been put in place in European late funder 
countries do not have the same high degree of collective responsibility that was characteristic 
of both their previous PAYGO systems and the mature funded systems in Finland, 
Switzerland and the Netherlands.  
However, the new funded pension systems in European late funder countries have not 
adopted the neo-liberal governance strategy in toto. Rather, Sweden in particular and most of 
the other countries except for France have chosen a hybrid mix of neo-liberal, social-liberal 
and social-democratic governance elements, thereby opting for intermediate degrees of 
collective responsibility for status maintenance. Moreover, Australia, Ireland, New Zealand 
and the UK have begun to depart from the purely neo-liberal governance path and are now – 
to a greater or lesser extent – adopting elements of social-liberal governance. At the same 
time, the Netherlands and especially Switzerland have somewhat reduced their high level of 
collective responsibility for status maintenance by (partially) abolishing the intergenerational 
sharing of financial market risks. 
Thus a certain cross-national, albeit not ubiquitous, trend towards intermediate degrees 
of collective responsibility for status maintenance can be discerned. This finding shows that 
the hybridisation hypothesis, which predicts convergence towards mixed regulatory 
frameworks based on market mechanisms that stress individual responsibility as well as on 
social policy structures that promote collective responsibility, is indeed supported by recent 
developments to some extent. However, this is not the case in all countries. It does not apply 
to Canada, Finland, France or the US and in some countries, including Australia, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland, hybridisation remains quite limited. Moreover, a distinction has 
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to be made between different kinds of mixed frameworks that entwine markets and social 
policy structures. They can be established either by adopting a social-liberal governance 
strategy, as currently proposed in the UK, which is a governance type in its own right, or by 
mixing governance elements from all three governance strategies, as in Sweden.  
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